SUMMARY: By examining the process of land use conversion in
I. INTRODUCTION
URBAN-RURAL RELATIONS have conventionally been understood in terms of social and economic interactions and linkages between two distinct modes of production and reproduction.
(1) These relationships might be in the form of household livelihood strategies that straddle the two sectors;
(2) flows of commodities, capital and migrants; or, more recently, in new forms of "urbanization" that embody elements of both the urban and the rural. While each of these approaches provides useful insights, they essentially overlook the politics of rural-urban relations both in terms of the policy choices that are made relating to the use of land and with regard to the political processes (broadly conceived) that facilitate land conversion.
This paper examines some of the developmental priorities and political processes involved in land conversion in the Philippines, and the region around Manila in particular (see Maps 1 and 2). It is in the agricultural provinces of Manila's extended metropolitan region that some of the country's most productive farmlands also form the core region of an industrializing and gloPhilip Kelly recently completed a PhD in Geography at the University of British Columbia in Canada. He is now lecturer in Southeast Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore. His current research examines the economic and political dimensions of globalization in Southeast Asia, focusing on the labour process in sites of foreign direct investment in the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia.
MANILA balizing national economy. The result has been a process of regionalized urbanization in which urban-rural relations are primarily constituted in the encroachment of urban land uses and employment into rural settings. Large swathes of irrigated agricultural land in the "rice bowl" provinces of the Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog regions have been converted to a variety of urban and industrial uses: export processing zones and industrial estates; institutions such as hospitals and universities; leisure landscapes such as golf courses, resorts and theme parks; and, most significantly in terms of the area involved, residential sub-divisions. The result is a reworking of the social and economic, as well as the physical, landscape of formerly "rural" areas, such that even within the same household the urban-industrial economy might co-exist with agricultural production. Thus, while urban-rural economic relations elsewhere in the country might operate across a distinct spatial divide, in the mega-urban region of Manila (and other primate cities of South-east Asia), the traditional dichotomy between the "rural" and the "urban" has become less meaningful.
This blurring of boundaries is, however, an intensely political process. In the Southern Tagalog region in particular, the process of land conversion from agricultural to urban uses has been an issue of contentious public debate in recent years. It precipitates emotive issues relating to national food security, the priority given to industrial versus agricultural development, and the rights of tenant farmers and agricultural labourers. It is, therefore, an inherently political process in which decisions are made and options are exercised concerning land use and developmental priorities.
This paper examines the political contestation and negotiation of the land conversion process and suggests that ruralurban relations in Manila's mega-urban region must be seen as politicized at three interconnected levels of social relations -the national, the "local", and the personal. At a national level, specific policy frameworks exist that regulate the land conversion process but they are frequently circumvented and undermined by developmental strategies geared towards industrialization rather than agricultural modernization. At the level of local municipal governments, legislation allows considerable flexibility in interpreting zoning by-laws and therefore determining land uses. More importantly, this flexibility is applied in a context where the boundaries between public and private roles, and between regulatory responsibilities and vested interests, are frequently blurred. Finally, the "everyday politics" of relations between landlords, tenants and other local power brokers creates a context in which tenant farmers find it difficult even to assert their legal rights to adequate compensation or land redistribution through agrarian reform.
The paper is structured in the following way. The first section outlines the dimensions of land conversion in the Philippines and then focuses on Manila's mega-urban region in particular. Using unpublished government data, it is suggested that official figures may significantly underestimate the extent of land conversion. The second section will then highlight some of the social, economic and environmental issues that are associated with land conversion and which form the basis for opposition to the process. The subsequent three sections of the paper then describe the political processes, negotiations and resistance that have emerged around the issue of land conversion at the national, local and personal level.
The paper draws upon a total of nine months of fieldwork in 1994-95 both in Manila and in the adjacent province of Cavite to the south. The field research was based on surveys and interviews in two villages in the small market town of Tanza. More than 400 residents were surveyed for basic socio-economic data and more than 60 detailed interviews were conducted with farmers, ex-farmers, government officials, developers, youth leaders and other local residents. It should be added, however, that the information concerning the politics of land conversion that is presented here is drawn from a variety of experiences in Cavite as a whole and is not intended to imply the culpability of particular individuals.
II. THE DIMENSIONS OF LAND CONVERSION
IN THE 1990s, growing political concern and protest over land conversion in the Philippines has reflected the intensification of the process itself. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the government agency responsible for recording and regulating the land conversion process, started systematically recording conversions in March 1988. (4) Table 1 shows that, according to DAR records at least, over a seven-year period a total of 33,707 hectares of agricultural land were converted to other uses, either with legal clearance from DAR, without such clearance or exempted from clearance. Recent press reports suggest that the rapid rate of conversion continued and even accelerated in 1996. By June 1997, DAR's cumulative conversion total (approved, illegal or exempted) since 1988 had reached 56,965 hectares, an increase of 23,258 hectares in just two years.
(5)
The figures in Table 1 also indicate that the process of land conversion has a distinctive geographical pattern within the Philippines. Looking at the approved conversions alone, approximately half of the national total was accounted for by Region IV (Southern Tagalog). This pattern reflects the mega-urbanization of Manila into its surrounding agricultural provinces -particularly Cavite and Laguna to the south. Significant, but much lower, levels of conversion were also experienced in Region III (Central Luzon) immediately to the north of Manila.
The importance of mega-urbanization in these figures can be illustrated by taking the province of Cavite as an example. There, the process of conversion has been driven by the development of large industrial estates across the province, mostly over the last five years. By 1995, the province had 11 major industrial estates employing almost 55,000 workers. To house these workers, and to accommodate commuters employed in Manila, housing estates started to proliferate across the province in the 1990s. This process of urbanization is reflected in dramatic increases in the cost of land in Cavite. In the province as a whole, the cost of home lots increased by an average 20.4 per cent each year between 1990 and 1993 (this compares with a 5.5 per cent increase in Metro Manila).
(6) Table 2 indicates the conversions that were registered with the provincial government between 1988 and mid-1995 and illustrates the importance of residential and, to a lesser extent, industrial activities in the process of land conversion. It is significant to note that between 1989 and 1993, the recorded area of irrigated rice land in Cavite fell from 14,710 hectares to 12,800 hectares -a decline which would imply a substantial impact from land conversion to other uses. 
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There are, however, reasons to suspect that these figures from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) represent only a fraction of the land actually taken out of agricultural production. The figures do not include, for example, land that is lying idle because its owners have removed the tenant farmers and are waiting for a more profitable moment to convert the land to other uses. In addition, many lands have simply been converted without the knowledge of the DAR.
An indication of the extent to which land conversion goes unrecorded can be gleaned from data recorded at the municipal level using Tanza in Cavite as an example. Data at the municipal offices show 248 hectares of agricultural land as being approved, or exempted from approval, for conversion between 1989 and 1994, and a further 119 hectares as having been forwarded to the provincial DAR office for processing. These figures indicate a significantly higher rate of conversion than that shown by data held by the national DAR office which records just 214 hectares of land converted over the same period and none being processed. Furthermore, local figures also record 222 hectares of land as having been converted without permission, the vast majority for residential sub-divisions.
(9) These conversions do not feature anywhere in national DAR records. Separate data on rice lands in Tanza, gathered by local Department of Agriculture extension workers, suggest that over 400 hectares of irrigated rice land were lost to other uses between 1989 and 1995. (10) Putting these figures together suggests that official national figures for a town such as Tanza should be almost doubled to match locally collected data on legal and illegal conversions. Furthermore, it would seem that irrigated rice land accounts for almost all of the total conversion.
III. CONTESTED TERRITORY: THE POLITICS OF LAND CONVERSION
THE LANDSCAPE OF "rural" towns such as Tanza is characterized by a patchwork of urban development and continuing agricultural production. In more remote villages, agricultural land is still farmed although water supply for irrigation and labour supply at harvesting and planting times represent perennial problems for farmers. (11) In more accessible areas, however, large swathes of land have been converted to industrial uses or residential sub-divisions. Alternatively, land may simply lie idle, with cattle grazing on grassed-over rice fields whose owners await either development permits or more propitious market conditions. When residential development occurs, there are several different types of sub-division that might be constructed. A "first class" sub-division includes house lots and full service provision -septic tanks for household sewage, concreted roads, pavements, rudimentary basketball courts and perhaps even a chapel. In such sub-divisions, house lots are sold to buyers who then construct their own homes on the site. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the "low-cost" sub-division in which 8. "Cavite has a high rate of illegal land conversions, claim farmers groups", Business World, 10 June, 1991.
9. Of the legal conversions, 254.2 hectares were for residential uses, 77.1 hectares for industrial, 13.1 hectares for institutional, 11.8 hectares for tourism resorts and 11.1 hectares were for unspecified uses (Source: unpublished data on land conversion, Municipal Agrarian Reform Office, Tanza, Cavite, 1995).
10. Unpublished data on farmers in Tanza, 1989 and 1995, Municipal Agricultural Officer, Tanza, Cavite. 11. Kelly, P. (forthcoming), "Everyday urbanization: the social dynamics of development in Manila's extended metropolitan region", International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. MANILA one-room, one-storey terraced units are constructed to a standardized design when a purchaser is found. These sub-divisions are designed as "social" housing and most are purchased through contributions to the government service insurance scheme or social security system, or to national savings schemes such as Pag-Ibig. Whatever the style of sub-division, house lots remain empty until a buyer is found or until the new owner decides to construct a house on the lot. The result is often a bleak landscape of occupied houses interspersed with vacant units or empty lots strewn with garbage.
The incursion of the "urban" into the "rural" in this way has implications at various levels. At the village level, socio-economic and environmental changes are experienced that have, on several occasions, led to outright resistance to land conversion. At a national level the politics of resistance to land conversion are motivated by broader issues of food security and development priorities. Each of these issues is discussed in turn.
a. Social Change
The residents of new sub-divisions tend to be a mixture of young families related to long-standing villagers, and migrants from outside the barrio, most of whom have arrived to work in the emerging local industrial sector. In one such sub-division in Cavite, a survey conducted in 1995 of 301 residents revealed that approximately two-thirds were born outside the municipality in which it is located.
Profound social changes have resulted from this recent influx of migrants to expanding villages in Cavite. During interviews in one village in 1995, those who were born in the barrio spoke of the breakdown of formerly tight social networks and a growing feeling of anomie and "urbanness":
Q: "Are there big differences from when you were growing up in Mulawin?" A: "Big ones! Of course it's not the same as before, the camaraderie is different. Those who are really from here are different. Everybody was like a relative. Unlike now, when the trend is for those people from other provinces [to come here], it's as if it's every man for himself. Not like before, when if someone was sick you would visit them because they are relatives and friends. It's like Manila now. Manila lifestyle." (Cavite villager, 1995, translated from Tagalog) Others too talked of changing interpersonal relations (pakikisama) and a growing unease with the anonymity of their social milieu. Evidently, the tightly woven social fabric that has been the norm in rural areas is becoming unravelled. The sheer number of new people in the village means that they cannot be absorbed into existing social networks. A personalized system, through which relationships were structured ranging from personal disputes to business arrangements, has been broken down by the influx of newcomers. Inevitably, tensions and suspicions result:
MANILA "When sub-divisions were constructed it became disordered, with lots of different kinds of people here. It's difficult to get along with different people, and that's why it's become very difficult since we've had these sub-divisions." (Cavite villager, 1995, translated from Tagalog) The social consequences of land conversion also include issues of equity and justice. As will be described later, conversion is frequently used as a means of circumventing agrarian reform, so that an opportunity for redistribution of rural income is lost.
(12) But displaced tenant farmers will, at least, receive disturbance compensation. The biggest losers in the process of land conversion are landless agricultural labourers who do not have tenancy rights that must be compensated, who are dependent on agricultural work for their livelihoods and who have little formal education or experience that might offer opportunities in the urban-industrial economy. For this group, already the most marginal in rural society, land conversion represents a profound dislocation. Many in the farm lobby point out that the agricultural sector has the ability to absorb such labour in a way that the manufacturing industry is incapable of doing on a similar scale. 
b. Environmental Impacts
The environmental consequences of land conversion have been widely criticized.
(14) Vicente Ladlad, for example, highlights the impact of land use conversion in Laguna on the biological productivity of Laguna de Bay, a freshwater lake to the southeast of Manila.
(15) Elsewhere, urban and industrial development are in direct conflict with agricultural activities. In Cavite, for example, farmers complain that irrigation canals have become silted up with eroded material from local building sites, thus impeding water supply. In other cases, water supply is also blocked by household refuse as new residents respond to inadequate service provision by simply discarding their waste into nearby canals. Farmers also complain that crop pests have become an increasing problem with the development of residential areas in the midst of farmland.
c. Food Security
The concentration of land conversion in some of the country's most productive agricultural areas has raised the issue of national food security.
(16) Total rice production in the Philippines continues to fall short of national demand. Over the last five years, the country has imported between 200,000 and 900,000 metric tons annually. (17) In the first half of 1997, 650,000 metric tons of rice were imported to safeguard against diminished yields.
(18) Every decision to purchase rice has been met with condemnation from opposition politicians and agrarian advocacy groups. Official figures indicating that 50,000 hectares of land have been converted since 1988 would seem to represent only a fractional impact upon the country's total rice land area 
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which is in excess of 2 million hectares. But many groups believe that the concentration of conversions in the most productive rice-growing regions of Southern Tagalog and Central Luzon has compromised national food security and necessitated imports.
d. Developmental Priorities
A broader theme, incorporating many of the issues already described, concerns the relative importance given to agricultural development versus industrialization. The Philippines' economic and social development programme during the Ramos administration has been guided by the Medium-term Philippine Development Plan, 1993 Plan, -1998 . The Plan's emphasis rests squarely on industrial development in selected regional industrial centres where incentives encourage the location of foreign direct investment in the export oriented electronics and garments sectors. The plan also calls for "agri-industrialization", with linkages to be established between industry and local agricultural producers, but the mechanisms for creating these linkages are not spelled out. Indeed, the sectoral focus of the plan leaves little space for such linkages. Agri-industrialization, it seems, has come to mean industrial development located in agricultural areas rather than the formation of functional linkages between the two sectors.
Non-governmental organizations and some scholars have been outspoken in criticizing these development priorities. The Philippine Peasant Institute, for example, argues that "...of all the gaps in the MTPDP, its most crucial oversight is still its insubstantive emphasis on agriculture and its failure to recognize the sector's role as the key to sustainable growth." (20) Similarly, Greg Bankoff argues that there is an "...inherent inconsistency at the center of government policy" between a policy of rapid industrialization and a programme of agrarian reform and agricultural development.
(21) The main thrust of such opposition focuses on the neglect of the agricultural sector when it still constitutes the livelihood of approximately 50 per cent of the country's workforce. In addition, many argue that experiences elsewhere in East Asia have shown that improving rural incomes through vigorous agrarian reform is the most effective means of stimulating aggregate demand and inducing industrial development. Such sentiments have not been limited to scholars and research institutes. Farmers regularly picket the Department of Agrarian Reform headquarters in Quezon City (Metro Manila) and, in May 1997, a group of farmers staged a demonstration at a shareholders' meeting of Fil-Estate, one of the country's largest real-estate developers, to protest against the unregulated conversion of irrigated farmland for residential subdivisions. (22) For reasons based on each of the issues described above, land conversion has been a contested issue at both local and national level in the Philippines. And yet the process has continued and accelerated in recent years. To understand why this is so, it is necessary to explore not only the political issues in- MANILA volved in land conversion but also the political process as it is constituted at multiple levels in the Philippines. This question will be addressed in the subsequent three sections, which focus on the national, local, and "everyday" politics of land conversion.
IV. LAWS OF THE LAND: THE NATIONAL POLITICS OF LAND CONVERSION
LAND USE CONVERSION in the Philippines is currently regulated through a bewildering variety of laws, administrative orders, memoranda and legal precedents. Most significantly, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 (Republic Act 6657) protects from conversion those rice and corn lands eligible for redistribution (from landlord to tenant farmer). Such lands may only be converted after a lapse of five years from the time that a Certificate of Land Transfer is issued. Even then, the land must have ceased to be economically usable for cultivation or must be situated in a predominantly "urbanized" locality. In addition, the CARL gave the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) authority to regulate the conversion of any agricultural land, regardless of tenure arrangements and crops types. In these cases, the land use plans drawn up by local government units (usually municipalities or cities) and approved by regional planning bodies would form the basis for deciding the appropriate use for specific parcels of land.
The CARL, however, far from assuaging land conversion has, in many cases, actually accelerated the process. Landlords keen to avoid losing their land could convert it to other crops or to non-agricultural uses. In many cases, tenant farmers have been removed and the land has just been left idle. This might seem to be an irrational use of a productive asset but the institutional and legal framework established by the CARL makes it an attractive option for landowners. Leaving a farmer to cultivate rice would make it difficult to obtain a non-agricultural zoning from the local government. Moreover, the longer a tenant is allowed to farm while land prices increase, the higher the compensation packages. This extra compensation would likely far outweigh any rental payments the owner might receive from the tenant if cultivation continued for a few extra years. There are, therefore, both legal and economic rationales to explain why landowners are keen to remove their tenant farmers as soon as possible, and which explain the common sight of former rice land sitting idle, occupied only by grazing cattle.
The tension between agrarian reform and land conversion came to a head in 1990. In a widely publicized case, farmers in the village of Langkaan in Cavite came into conflict with the developers of an industrial estate over the fate of 232 hectares of rice land. The land was owned by a government agency, the National Development Corporation (NDC), which planned to develop the First Cavite Industrial Estate on the site in collaboration with the Marubeni Corporation of Japan. In October 1989, the partners applied to the Department of Agrarian Reform for permission to convert the land. By that time, however, the DAR had identified the property as eligible for redistribution under the CARL, with 180 potential farmer beneficiaries. The DAR denied permission for the conversion on the grounds that the land was irrigated and productive, that tenant farmers could be clearly identified, and because the process of acquisition for redistribution had started prior to the application for conversion. (23) The dispute came down to a simple choice. Would the property be retained as productive agricultural land and redistributed to tenant farmers under the CARL or would the owners of the land be allowed to develop it as an industrial estate? The new Secretary of State for Agrarian Reform, Florencio "Butch" Abad, then undergoing a confirmation hearing on his appointment before Congress, made abundantly clear his opinion that the land should be retained and redistributed under CARL. This position pitted him against the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) which favoured the development of an industrial estate on the site. The result was a tense and public standoff between two branches of the government and a controversy that delayed congressional confirmation of Abad's appointment (and eventually led to his resignation).
(24) The DTI finally prevailed by seeking and obtaining a legal opinion from the Department of Justice (Opinion Number 44, Series of 1990) that the authority of DAR to rule on conversions applied only to those conversions made after June 15th 1988 (when CARL or RA 6657 became effective). In other words, where a municipal or city development plan prior to that date zones land as non-agricultural, then it takes precedence even if the land is, in fact, still being cultivated.
The result was that the development of the industrial estate in Langkaan could proceed. More importantly, however, a decision had been made that undermined the authority of DAR to control land conversion and which, instead, allowed conversion to go ahead if a document could be produced, dated prior to June 1988, indicating that a piece of land was zoned for nonagricultural activities. The outcome of the Langkaan controversy was, therefore, less a technical legal decision and more a political decision to prioritize industrial development over the agricultural sector. The consequences of the decision are apparent in Table 1 , which shows that conversions exempted under Opinion 44 far exceed those approved by DAR.
The following year, the scope of land use management by local governments was substantially enhanced through the Local Government Code (LGC) (Republic Act 7160). The LGC is a broad-ranging piece of legislation that devolves significant administrative and revenue-raising powers to local government units with the intention of enhancing service provision, accountability and local democracy. (25) Section 20 of the Code gives municipalities the power to reclassify up to 15 per cent of agricultural land not covered by CARL to non-agricultural uses if it is deemed by the local council (sanggunian) to be either: no longer "sound" for agriculture or of substantially greater value if used for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. These MANILA remarkably loose conditions effectively gave power over land use conversion to local municipalities -an issue that will be examined further in the next section.
By the end of 1992, public concern over the extent to which agricultural lands were being converted prompted presidential involvement. In November, Malacañang Palace issued Administrative Order Number 20, directing that all irrigated and irrigable land covered by existing irrigation projects should be immune from conversion. The purpose of the Order was to protect prime agricultural lands from conversion but the one-page directive lacked any implementing regulations or punitive measures to deter transgressors.
While such legislative support for preserving agricultural land lacked mechanisms for enforcement, the political process of undermining protective regulations continued. In September 1993, Executive Order 124 outlined guidelines for prioritizing agricultural land conversion in areas designated as regional agriindustrial centres, regional industrial centres, tourism development areas and "socialized" housing sites. The Order did not supersede the President's previous directive to protect irrigated lands but it did provide a mechanism for presidential approval if such lands were needed. Once again, however, no sanctions were stipulated for non-compliance.
On a national scale, the areas involved in the provisions of EO 124 are relatively small, although not insignificant. In 1993, regional agri-industrial centres across the country amounted to 5,526 hectares, while tourism development areas totalled 12,873 hectares.
(26) But, perhaps more than any other piece of legislation, EO 124 highlights the political decisions that were, and are, being made at a national level about the priority given to urban-industrial development over the agricultural sector.The legal setting for land conversion, therefore, is one in which various steps have been taken to protect agricultural land but with few provisions for punishing offenders. At the same time, various laws have undermined the control of the DAR. But, perhaps more importantly, the political climate created by these legislative moves has been one in which industrial development is aggressively promoted while agricultural land (and by extension, the agricultural sector) is seen as expendable where it conflicts with other priorities. Such flexibility has made the circumvention of land conversion regulations relatively easy for those with the means and the connections.
Several steps can be taken by landowners to enable land conversion (and avoid agrarian reform). Firstly, national and regional officials in various government agencies are frequently found to be open to "persuasion". Reports circulate of officials in the National Irrigation Authority certifying land as unirrigated or the DAR failing to recognize legitimate tenants eligible for agrarian reform. One land developer in Cavite talked openly to me about using high-level government contacts in Manila to secure a land conversion clearance from the Department of Agrarian Reform. Secondly, landlords may simply pay disturbance compensation to tenants, removing them from land that will then sit idle. After a few years in such a state, the owner MANILA can claim that the land is "non-productive" and therefore eligible for conversion.
(27) Thirdly, cases have been reported of irrigation canals being destroyed and filled so that regulations such as AO 20 do not apply. In July 1997, the Agrarian Reform Secretary, Ernesto Garilao, publicly condemned this practice and called on the National Irrigation Authority to stop certifying irrigated areas as unproductive lands.
(28) Finally, local officials have the authority to redefine land as zoned for non-agricultural use even when it is still being cultivated. The result of these loopholes and avoidance strategies is that relatively few land conversions are technically illegal but many clearly contravene the spirit and intent of the laws regulating conversion.
For several years, the Philippine government has acknowledged the need for a national land use plan that would rationalize the various land conversion laws into an integrated set of regulations with appropriate sanctions to punish non-compliance. In 1992, President Fidel Ramos declared such a plan to be a personal priority for his first 100 days in office It took until June 1994, however, before a draft of the National Land Use Code was released by the National Economic and Development Authority. In October 1997, after two years of deliberation, the House of Representatives approved the Code as House Bill 9147, the National Land Use Act. (29) The Act integrates various national policies on the allocation, utilization and development of land resources, and includes sections that consolidate existing legislation governing the conversion of agricultural land. In particular, it confirms the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform over conversion decisions and limits the role of local governments to authorizing the conversion of non-agricultural land to other uses. The decision to convert agricultural land is, however, placed solely with the DAR. The Act also includes provisions for a land conversion tax which would both discourage speculative conversion and would generate revenue for agricultural development. The National Land Use Act is, however, now with the Senate where it has been shelved due to lack of time and probably will not receive attention before the May 1998 elections. This on-going saga gives some indication of the political sensitivity of the issue, particularly among legislators with extensive business interests in farming and real estate. At the national level, then, there exists a pattern of legislative action that has produced regulations which lack punitive sanctions and which provide numerous ways for circumvention. At the same time, industrial development has been aggressively promoted, creating a political environment in which urban-industrial land uses have taken priority over agriculture. Examining legislation, however, shows only the policy directions and frameworks that are provided. It is at a local level that key decisions are made and the practical politics of land conversion are activated.
27. "Government wants replacement tax for land conversion plans", Business World, 25 August, 1997.
28. "Government strictly monitoring land conversion applicants", Business World, 3 July, 1997.
See reference 5.
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V. THE LOCAL POLITICS OF LAND CONVERSION
NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON land conversion provides flexibility in implementation and, in many cases, opportunities for noncompliance with little threat of punishment. It is, however, largely in the murky world of Philippine local politics that regulations and procedures become open to interpretation and selective enforcement.
In a formal sense, this local level control is mandated by the Local Government Code of 1991 described earlier. But the LGC assumes the existence of an independent and efficient bureaucratic system at a local level and a clear division between regulators and developers. In most instances neither of these conditions apply. Many towns do not even have precisely defined or publicly available zoning maps, leaving decisions over the reclassification of land to local officials, particularly mayors. Numerous reports and personal interviews suggest that such rezoning decisions often involve bribery and kickbacks.
(30) Moreover, as the process of DAR conversion clearance starts with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, that process too can be open to abuse by local officials who may certify that the land has "ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes" and that farmers on the land have been properly compensated, when the opposite is true. Farmers' rights as agrarian reform beneficiaries have also been compromised where redistribution has been prevented or withdrawn, often with pressure being applied to local agrarian reform officials. It should also be said, however, that many farmers have been only too happy to sell their tenancy rights given the marginal profitability of rice cultivation and the often generous compensation packages that are negotiated.
In addition to their regulatory roles, municipal mayors are also frequently powerful political "bosses" in a more informal sense, with considerable coercive resources in the form of law enforcement officers (the LGC also placed local police detachments under the jurisdiction of municipal officials) and private retainers. Numerous documented examples exist of pressure being brought to bear on farmers in Cavite who have resisted the decision to convert farmland. As a result, municipal politicians have been able to exert considerable control over the land conversion process. When asked why irrigated land has been converted even though the law states that it is protected, one village official told me that "...with our current system [of government] it passes through." Another Caviteno, this time a relatively wealthy banker, elaborated on this sentiment: "In fact, they're the ones selling all the lands. No lands here move without the mayor knowing it. People will not buy agricultural lands and therefore they will only buy land if there is a chance of having it converted. And therefore you'd have to go to the mayor, because he's the only one empowered to certify that this land is part of a zone converted to industrial use." (Cavite resident, 1995) 
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The result, according to John Sidel, is that "...Cavite's municipal mayors have evolved into the province's leading real estate agents and brokers." (31) The heavy involvement of local politicians in the land conversion process relates partly to a desire to foster residential and industrial growth within their jurisdictions -land uses which provide far greater revenue-raising potential than agricultural production. But mayors and councillors are also usually significant players in the local economy in their own right and, in many cases, have vested interests in the land conversion process. These interests might involve ownership of land which will increase in value as other parcels of land are urbanized, or simply kickbacks from developers wishing to smooth the process of obtaining permission for land conversion and development permits. During interview in 1995, one farmer in Cavite commented: "I don't know why [it happens], but I really don't like it. We cannot do anything about it. It's our leaders who let it happen. They [developers] pay them so that it will be built. There's nothing that can be done." (1995, translated from Tagalog) Another villager echoed that sense of powerlessness: "...even if you protest, the person to whom you take your grievance will have something to do with the project." Moreover, the involvement of local politicians was evident in more than just the hearsay of villagers. Land developers too described encounters with mayors who demanded kickbacks in exchange for granting certification that the land could be converted. In one case, this demand, made behind closed doors, was for two lots in the planned sub-division and a substantial cash payment.
Provincial authorities technically have little power to influence land conversion decisions but in Cavite accusations were widespread in the early 1990s that Governor Juanito Remulla (1979-95) was complicit in coercing conversion in several instances. (32) The principal ways in which this influence was exercised was through the persuasion or coercion of uncooperative municipal officials and tenant farmers. Such persuasion took the form of money to add a further incentive for compliance or the provision of manpower for forced evictions: (33) "In numerous documented cases, he [Remulla] has dispatched armed goons, ordered the bulldozing of homes and engineered the destruction of irrigation canals so as to expedite the departure of "squatters" and tenant farmers demanding compensation for their removal from lands designated for sale to Manila based or foreign companies for 'development' into industrial estates. Though Remulla typically tempers such hardball tactics with offers of a 'settlement', the 'carrot' is never as impressive as the 'stick'." (34) In another study of land use change in Cavite in the 1980s, John McAndrew notes that: MANILA "...legal measures to impede the conversion of farmland into sub-divisions remained largely ineffective. While tenanted rice and corn lands were covered under the agrarian reform programme, resistance to relinquish family farms met with harassment and even threat to life. Tenants had really no option but to forfeit their rights of tenure and accept the cash payments offered to them in compensation. On their part, local government officials often acted as brokers or agents of landlords and corporate developers." (35) The local politics of individual enrichment and bureaucratic corruption cannot, however, be divorced from the wider politics of development that lie behind the changes occurring in Cavite. In broad terms, this refers to the political agenda described earlier that focuses on industrialization through globalized development. But, more practically, this strategy translates into the priorities set for government agencies. In the case of irrigation authorities, for example, some farmers in Cavite complain that the irrigation system, while constructed with substantial loans from the World Bank for the Second Laguna de Bay Irrigation Project, is in fact neglected on the ground with dyke maintenance and water supply inadequate for their needs: "...it's because of the interest of many government officials. That is a very big question for us." Two sets of forces, then, work against the proper regulation of the land conversion process. One is in the priorities set by the administration in terms of development strategies, and particularly the relative importance given to agricultural versus industrial development. Appeals against land conversion fall on deaf ears at both provincial and national levels. The other is the power given to local level political leaders and their susceptibility to influence through bribes or personal favours.
VI. THE "EVERYDAY POLITICS" OF LAND CONVERSION
THE INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS of land conversion at national and local levels provide only a partial picture of the process of land conversion as it is actually experienced by individual tenant farmers. To complete the picture, a less formal set of "everyday" power politics must be explored in the form of personal relationships between landlords and tenants.
(36) Such relationships carry with them substantial weight in propelling the conversion process.
The start of the land conversion process from the farmer's point of view comes when the landowner approaches with the suggestion that he/she might wish to sell the land and tries to evaluate the tenant's likely demands for compensation: "What they will do is they will approach us. Naturally, we first talk about farming. [ MANILA reach an agreement.' Two or three times they'll approach you. Of course, he is the one who is more eager to sell. In our case, since what we want is to avoid a dispute, then we agree. That is how the system works." (Ex-farmer in Cavite, 1995, translated from Tagalog) Negotiations inevitably vary according to the individuals involved but the social relationship between landlord and tenant, going beyond their economic arrangements, means that farmers often feel "ashamed" or "embarrassed" to negotiate as strongly as they might. Farmers feel unable to go beyond certain culturally prescribed bounds:
"It is inappropriate for you to act superior to the owner of the land." (Cavite farmer, 1995, translated from Tagalog) "For us, we just go along with the agreement, because it's theirs, and it's inappropriate for us to say we don't want to. It will appear that we are becoming greedy over it." (Cavite farmer, 1995, translated from Tagalog) A farmer's association with the owner is thus more than just a legalistic, landlord-tenant relationship. The bond between the two families may date back several generations and the landlord might, for example, be a godparent to the tenant's children. Consequently, tenants are reluctant to try forcing their legal rights and souring personal relationships: "That's it, that's their proposal. Of course, you're ashamed because we've been together for a long time. We don't want them to say we were greedy when the law [agrarian reform] came, doing everything by the letter of the law. We don't want that, so I just accepted it. Even though what is happening is painful, there's nothing we can do about the situation." (Ex-farmer, Cavite, 1995, translated from Tagalog) The result is that landowners are able to persuade tenants to relinquish their tenancy rights even where farmers might have legal rights to the land or legal means to block a conversion. In any case, the system of verbal agreements and unwritten understandings on which agrarian life is based is inconsistent with a legal system of documentation and regulation. In such circumstances, it is invariably the educated landlord, with high social status, sufficient resources to bribe officials and access to legal counsel, whom the situation will favour. But, once again, it should also be added that there are farmers (and potential agrarian reform beneficiaries) who would rather enjoy a lucrative cash settlement than continue farming with marginal profits or take on the added burden of amortization payments under agrarian reform. Thus, all land is effectively negotiable if the two parties can reach an agreement. As one village official noted: "...with every law there is an exception, if two persons agree with each other."
The settlement that is eventually reached between landlord MANILA and tenant will usually provide both a cash payment and a small parcel of land on which the tenants can build houses for themselves and for their children. Cash payments have escalated in recent years but individual settlements vary according to the location of the land involved and the negotiating skills of the tenant. In 1995, a typical compensation package amounted to approximately P 500,000 (UK £12,500 at 1995 rates) for each hectare of farmland (or 50 pesos per square metre) and a house lot of 1,000-2,000 square metres. The selling price of land to a developer, meanwhile, might be many times greater. One price being quoted by a landowner in Tanza in 1995 was 350 pesos per square metre (3.5 million pesos per hectare).
VII. CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF THE RURAL-URBAN INTERFACE
FOR AT LEAST a century, land has been the key source of power and conflict in the Philippines. In the past, the struggle has focused on the control of agricultural land as the basis for wealth, patronage and political dominance. This paper has shown that land continues to be a highly politicized asset but it is now the potential of agricultural land for urban-industrial uses that motivates the will to control it rather than the need to dominate the agricultural economy and workforce. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the struggle over land conversion in the hinterland of Metropolitan Manila. Land conversion has, however, been a contested process. For reasons of social dislocation and injustice, and environmental conflicts between urban and rural sectors, the conversion of land for urban-industrial uses has been resisted at a local level. At the same time, issues of food security and the relative merits of a globalized industrialization strategy for development have motivated political opposition on a wider scale. Such resistance has not, however, proven to be effective in curbing the accelerating process of conversion. This paper has described the political processes that have facilitated land conversion at three different levels of analysis. At the national level, a complex web of legislation has created numerous loopholes and opportunities for evasion without adequate deterrents. At the same time, the government's national development strategy has been based on the "Philippines 2000 vision" which aims to bring the country into the ranks of the newly industrialized economies by the year 2000. Industrial development is thus aggressively promoted while the agricultural sector has been implicitly neglected. At the local level, power over land use decisions has been decentralized into contexts where boundaries between public sector regulation and private economic interests are blurred. This has, in turn, created a political framework conducive to conversion. Finally, at the level of personal relationships between landlords and tenants, the "everyday politics" of conversion is played out in a cultural context of patron-client ties that preclude farmers from asserting their legal rights.
Urban-rural relations, at least in the context of Manila's mega-MANILA urban region, cannot therefore be seen solely in terms of household strategies, flows of exchange (in the form of migration, capital etc.) or new and distinctive forms of "urbanization" in which the "rural" and "urban" coexist. Instead, the relationship between urban and rural sectors must be seen as existing in tension as different developmental priorities are played out. The tension over these priorities must, moreover, be recognized as a highly political struggle, in terms of both the consequences of land conversion from agricultural to urban uses and in terms of the processes through which this conversion is facilitated.
